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Introduction 
• Do volatile energy markets condemn the effort to price carbon and to get a price 
signal right? 
More precisely,  
• Does dramatic decrease of oil and gas prices to condemn the effort of carbon pricing 
and to get a price signal right? 
• Low oil prices are perceived as postponing indefinitely low carbon investments,       but 
does the decline of long term costs of renewables/low carbon sufficient to make any 
carbon pricing an effective signal to trigger investment whatever the energy price?  
 
Divergent opinions about this duration, but the problem is not there:  
• Beyond cyclicity of international energy prices, uncertainty and risk-aversion of investors  
• Carbon pricing is not able to compensate the radical decrease of international fuel price  
• (example of inability of the EU ETS to balance to decrease of coal price, vis-à-vis CCGTs 
(mothballing) 
• Reality of low carbon options, in particular for the renewables, despite their cost decrease 
• Very capital intensive with large upfront costs;  
• Long lead time to develop different low carbon equipment, new infrastructure at large scale, 
(exposure to risks) 
Content 
So three points 
• How the oil price U-turn neutralized the effects of carbon pricing efforts 
in emerging and developed countries? 
 
• Could we overcome the problem by establishing “energy+ carbon price” 
in the function of leading price signal, at least in the rich countries? 
 
• Which pragmatic approach in the emerging countries to get around the 
problem of accommodating climate policies and pricing instrument, 
inside existing energy policies confront to changing international energy 
prices? 
 
1. Neutralization of carbon pricing efforts in emerging and developed countries  
 
Equivalent of cyclical changes of oil price  in terms of carbon price changes (all things being equal) 
 
 
 
 
Not in the order of magnitude of the carbon tax (€/tCO2) 
 
 
 
Idem for the ETS prices  
 
 
 
  
More similar to energy/carbon excise duty on motor fuels in Europe:  in average for gasoline & diesel 150-250 
€/tCO2 
 
 
Hike  $35 bbl   (July 2007) to  
$145 bbl    (December 2008) 
+ $ 255 /tCO2 
Fall $115 bbl (2013/2014) to  
$ 45 per bbl (2015) 
  - $ 155 /tCO2 
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Neutralization of  effort in matter of fossil fuel subsidies 
 
Seize the opportunity of low prices to align the price on the cost or on the international 
price (opportunity cost)  
Suppression of fossil fuel subventions : « price gap » method for the consumer prices 
 But what reference price ? 
• Reference to international price ;  
• Reference to the marginal cost/average cost of production+ distribution as for electricity subsidies 
assessemnt 
 
 If price smoothing formula (Chile, Mexico, Brazil, etc.) ,  
 Price smoothing formula is considered as a subsidization during period of high prices  
Comparison of subsidies before and after oil price decrease 
Impact of the reference to international price in the « price gap » method 
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• The price-signal of an effort to align internal 
prices onto international prices, and not onto 
the marginal cost will be lost 
• Case of a producing country  
•  marginal cost at $ 60/bl, internal price at  $60  and 
international price is $120/bl 
• Suppression of subsidies by alignment on 
international price : a gain of $18 billion for a 
consumption of  
• But if price crash at $ 50/bl after alignment on 
international price ,  
• NOC looses money $3 billion 
• The former jump of internal price from $60 to $ 120 
had unusefully hurt its population  
 In this respect the criticism s of price 
smoothing formula s subsidy  do not 
hold 
  2. A normative approach for rich countries committed in climate mitigation objectives 
           What is the right signal to be sent to invest in a context of very large cycle of international fuel price? 
The main problem :  a price signal combining the pricing of a collective good and a private 
price with monopoly rent and speculative rent  
• To consider that the carbon price should be added to the energy price without taking into 
account its very large cyclicity  
• To consider that the international market of fuels is perfect without monopoly rent and 
speculative rent related to its financiarisation 
Discussion beyond the traditional cyclicity of a mineral markets and pricing of an exhaustible  resource with 
scarcity rent 
•  OPEC still has a cartel function after phases of destabilization 
• Speculation and liquidity of oil markets :  x 4 in 2003-2004 ! 
• $115-145  /bl was not aligned on the marginal cost  
• (Artificial game of non-commercial speculators’ anticipations) 
 
• Right signal that should be received by private and public investors: the sum of energy 
price and carbon price 
    It should be : 
• effective (credible, foreseeable on long term, price risk manageable) 
• fair (to recapture exporters’ and speculators’ rent  in phases of low price): 
 
  Towards a stable energy +carbon price by flexible carbon tax 
  Price                       
     Backstop technology cost 
 Total energy price 
                                                                                                                                Flexible carbon excise duty 
 
 
 
                                     
  International price 
 
                                                                                              T+20                                               Time 
 Towards a stable energy +carbon price by flexible carbon tax 
• To ensure an energy+carbon price predictable 
trajectory over 20 or 30 years, up to a targeted 
final energy price. 
 
• Carbon tax to be adjusted continuously 
depending on oil price fluctuations  
 
• To adapt ETS to energy price cyclicity  
• Cap is not sufficient to provoke a carbon price 
increase  
• To link the price floor to the level of the international 
oil price 
 
• The law establishes that it is the total price which 
matters: during price drops, tax increase not to be 
debated 
 
 
 Towards a stable energy +carbon price by flexible carbon tax 
Flexible carbon taxation is not accepted by economists.  
But if the theory on carbon pricing tells : 
 “Equalization of marginal benefits for the world and the 
marginal cost of abatement”  
     what if, if it is the consumers ?   
Marginal benefits for them =  mitigation + avoidance to 
pay the rent 
 
Stern report p.213.  
“If referring to the mitigation of the costs of climate 
change for the users, and not for the world as a whole, 
the avoided rents to be paid to producers could be 
included.”   
3. A pragmatic approach in emerging countries 
To accommodate the new climate objective among existing energy 
policy objectives 
 
• Need to understand the energy policy objectives  (energy security, 
economic development, affordability, energy access, competitiveness) 
• To acknowledge their political legitimacy: social equity, reduction of poorness 
 
As energy policy objectives could be pursued by a variety of instruments, 
revision of the package of instruments 
• to adapt the former energy pricing  instrument (energy taxation, subsidies) 
• to shift to another instrument more compatible with mitigation objective;  
• to organize smart adaptation of instruments to a carbon pricing phase-in 
 
  Before climate concern 
  
Since climate concern  
Protection of consumers 
(redistributive equity) 
Subsidies by pricing under cost  
  
Universal social tariff, lifeline tariffs, etc.  
Targeted social tariffs (related to 
prepayment meters) 
Universal grants   
Energy access 
 
Cross-subsidies for classical electrification Electrification based on renewables and 
decentralized systems 
Protection of 
consumers’ interest  
in power sector 
Public utility regulation very aware of 
households (California, US PUCs) 
Recycling of the generators’ carbon rent : 
universal grant to domestic consumers 
(California) 
Energy efficiency financing (California, 
RGGI)  
Competitiveness Reasonable price in energy intensive industries 80% rebate in exchange of energy 
efficiency commitments 
Free tax threshold of 60-80% 
Fiscal objective Excise duty on motor fuel  
(with rebate in some low productivity sectors) 
Higher excise duty, and use it for price 
smoothing  
Extension of excise duty to the other 
fossil fuels and to every use  
Enlargement of exemptions, rebates, 
recycling in reducing energy bills 
To conclude by summing up 
• Cyclicity of nergy prices neutralize crbon pricing efforts 
• Need of a pragmatic approach to acommodate carbon policy in energy 
policies face to cyclicity of oil price 
• Even with efficient carbon pricing, low carbon investments are difficult 
• Cyclicity of energy price adds a crucial difficulty 
Ideal solution : stable and credible “energy+carbon” price 
 
Pragmatic approaches with carbon pricing are possible 
•  But Mind the issues of competitiveness, affordability and equity 
• Importance of complementary programs  in matter of RES-E, low 
carbon,  energy efficiency , building, infrastructures 
 
Back up 
 
Comparison of subsidies before and after oil price decrease 
Impact of the reference in the « price gap » method 
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